University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 5

Confidentiality Agreements: The Florida Sunshine In Litigation Act,
The #Metoo Movement, And Signing Away The Right To Speak
Loune-Djenia Askew

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons

Recommended Citation
Loune-Djenia Askew, Confidentiality Agreements: The Florida Sunshine In Litigation Act, The #Metoo
Movement, And Signing Away The Right To Speak, 10 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 61 ()
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol10/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.

Confidentiality Agreements: The Florida
Sunshine In Litigation Act, The #Metoo
Movement, And Signing Away The Right
To Speak
Loune-Djenia Askew ∗

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 63
II. BACKGROUND: THE CLASH BETWEEN TWO FREEDOMS.................... 65
Freedom of Speech .......................................................................... 66
Freedom of Contract ....................................................................... 67
Confidentiality Agreements: Promises of Silence and Signing
Away the Right to Speak ............................................................ 68
III. CURRENT REMEDY FOR VICTIMS UNDER CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES: WHEN CONTRACTING AWAY YOUR RIGHT TO
SPEAK DOES NOT ALIGN WITH PUBLIC POLICY .............................. 70
Balancing......................................................................................... 70
Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy: Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 178 ...................................................... 70
*
Loune-Djenia Askew is a May 2020 Juris Doctor Candidate at Florida International
University (“FIU Law”). At FIU Law, Loune-Djenia is actively involved in extracurricular
activities while maintaining a position in the top 25% of her class. She is currently the
Executive Marketing Editor of the FIU Law Review, a Student Ambassador, the President
of the Caribbean Student Bar Association, one of the BLSA Reaching Out Directors of the
H.T. Smith Black Law Students Association (“BLSA”) Chapter, and the treasurer of the
Haitian American Law Student Association. Thus far, one of her most fulfilling roles has
been serving as the 2018-2019 BLSA 1L Retention Chair, where she helped remedy the
Black 1L retention rate at FIU. Upon graduation, she plans to continue to serve her
community and be an example in the Black, Caribbean and Haitian community, as a beacon
of excellence for the next generation. Loune-Djenia would like to thank her family and
friends for their constant encouragement, especially her loving husband Moses Askew, her
mother Luna Garcon, her mentor Tremaine Hemans, Esq., and her supportive law school
sister Kathleen Leon. Last but not least, a huge thank you to Professor Scott Norberg at
FIU Law, who this comment could not have been possible without his guidance.

61

62

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1

IV. THE FLORIDA SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT ................................... 73
Case Law in Favor of the “Public Hazard” Standard .................... 75
Case Law Against the “Public Hazard” Standard .......................... 76
V. RESOLUTION: THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE SHOULD ENACT
LEGISLATION DISFAVORING CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS
IN SEXUAL ABUSE SETTLEMENTS ................................................... 77
The #MeToo Movement and New Legislation ................................. 77
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 82

2019]

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS

63

I. INTRODUCTION
Television network Lifetime recently aired a documentary titled
“Surviving R. Kelly.” This six-part documentary featured woman after
woman discussing their experiences of sexual abuse by one of the
entertainment industry’s biggest stars. Not only were most of these victims
underage at the time of the abuse, many waited to speak out because they
were bound by confidentiality agreements with R. Kelly’s management
company. The series was received with mixed opinions, but many stood
in solidarity with the women due to the open forum started by the
#MeToo 1 movement.
Prior to the R. Kelly story, Hollywood was under scrutiny for a
very similar story about Harvey Weinstein. “On October 5, 2017, the New
York Times revealed that Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein had
reached at least eight settlements with women in response to allegations
of sexual harassment, some dating back to 1990.” 2 Like R. Kelly, Harvey
Weinstein used confidentiality agreements to keep his transgressions
secret. 3 Specifically, Weinstein used confidentiality agreements in
settlements with the victims, where the victims accepting payouts agreed
to strict confidentiality clauses prohibiting them from discussing the deal
and the events leading to it. 4 The Harvey Weinstein story also received
heightened scrutiny due to social media and the #MeToo movement.
Even before social media and the #MeToo movement, one famous
example that demonstrates the consequence of using confidentiality
agreements in sexual abuse cases “came to light” 5 about fifteen years ago
from the Catholic Church. 6 “For years, the Church used confidential
settlements to silence victims who had been abused by priests.” 7 These
confidentiality agreements hid the identities of the priests, and thus
allowed the priests to continue to serve at their parishes or other ministries

1
The #MeToo movement is a movement against sexual harassment and sexual assault.
This movement has shed light on the prevalence of sexual abuse, especially in the
workplace. See also ME TOO, www.metoomvmt.org.
2
Vasundhara Prasad, Note: If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of
Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret
Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2507-2508 (2018); Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey,
Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations
.html.
3
Kantor & Twohey, supra note 2.
4
Id.
5
“For there is nothing hidden that will not be disclosed, and nothing concealed that will
not be known or brought out into the open.” Luke 8:17 (NIV).
6
Prasad, supra note 2, at 2516-17.
7
Id.
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despite allegations of sexual assault. 8 In one specific case from 1997, the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany settled with a young man who had
been regularly abused by a priest since the age of twelve, for almost $1
million, using a confidentiality agreement. 9 The $1 million was just under
the amount required to trigger the Church from having to request approval
from its oversight board. 10 Therefore, the strategic settlement protected the
priest and the church from any public inquiry. 11 The confidential
settlement “allowed the abusive priest to keep his identity private, continue
working with the Church, and presumably, even repeat his abuse with
impunity,” in exchange for the victim’s silence. 12
With the current social climate, the right to speak is more
important than ever. Even in the employment sector, where confidentiality
agreements are frequently used, these agreements can be detrimental to
society. The public has a right to know when private parties are contracting
about matters of public interest and sexual abuse is a major area of public
interest as evidenced by the #MeToo movement. However, the public is
currently limited in its knowledge due to confidentiality agreements in this
realm.
This comment will discuss why Florida courts should not enforce
confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements, especially in light
of the #MeToo movement, and how Florida courts should interpret the
Sunshine in Litigation Act in sexual abuse settlements. Confidentiality
agreements in sexual abuse settlements make it possible for the abuser to
continue to victimize others. Therefore, confidentiality agreements in
sexual abuse settlements should be deemed void under the Florida
Sunshine in Litigation Act (“Act”), which voids any court order or private
agreement that conceals a “public hazard.” 13
The Florida legislature enacted the Sunshine in Litigation Act in
1990. 14 This Act provides that “a court may not enter a judgment that
conceals a public hazard.” 15 The Act has only been brought up in disputes
a few times before the Florida courts. However, no actions disputing the
Sunshine in Litigation Act has been brought in the sexual abuse context. 16
8

Id.
Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6,
2002), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowedabuse-priest-foryears/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Prasad, supra note 2, at 2516-17.
13
FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
The third district referred to the Act in Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895,
896 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), but denied construing the Act in any way.
9
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And, to date, there has been no published court decision on whether a
person against whom a sexual abuse claim has been made can be
considered a “public hazard.” This note argues, however, that alleged
sexual abusers do fit the Act’s definition of a “public hazard,” and that, as
such, Florida courts should interpret the Act to prohibit concealing
information via confidentiality agreements. 17 As a result, confidentiality
agreements in sexual abuse settlements would be void under Florida law.
Currently, courts perform a balancing test when presented with contracts
that may violate public policy. However, this remedy is not adequate to
protect the public’s interest in knowing about the settlement of such claims
because it includes a fact-intensive inquiry that applies on a case by case
basis only, rather than being applied as a bright-line rule, as this note
suggests. This comment also argues that, if it were construed that the
concealment of sexual abuse settlements and related confidentiality
agreements are not prohibited by the Sunshine in Litigation Act, the
Florida legislature should enact a statute prohibiting the concealment of
such settlements.
While Part I of this paper has provided an introduction to some of
the most salient issues affecting this topic, Part II of this comment will
discuss the clash of two freedoms – the freedom of speech and the freedom
of contract – as it relates to confidentiality agreements in cases of alleged
sexual abuse. Part III will discuss the remedy for sexual abuse victims
under current contract principles. Part IV will discuss the Florida Sunshine
in Litigation Act and how Florida courts should interpret confidentiality
in sexual abuse settlements. Part V will discuss a possible resolution while
considering a victim’s privacy concerns and Part VI will provide a
conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND: THE CLASH BETWEEN TWO FREEDOMS
Before analyzing confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse
settlements and the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act, it is important to
discuss the important beliefs which may be implicated by this issue.
Confidentiality agreements create a tension between two longstanding
American ideals: the freedom of speech and the freedom of contract. Both
of these freedoms derive from the Constitution of the United States. This
section of the comment will discuss the freedom of speech, the freedom of
contract and the tension between both freedoms that is evident in when
discussing the current presence – and perhaps, future prohibition – of
confidentiality agreements.
17

Fla. Stat. § 69.081.
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Freedom of Speech
The freedom of speech is a fundamental right and specifically
provided for in the language of the First Amendment. The First
Amendment of the United States Constitution prescribes, in pertinent part,
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 18
The rights described within the First Amendment are considered
fundamental rights – ones that are “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,” 19 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 20
Indeed, the freedom of speech has historically been considered so valuable
that it has been deemed as a preferred right over other rights, to be
protected at all costs. And, although the First Amendment was originally
written to protect “the people” 21 from the government’s infringement on
their right to speak, the protection of the freedom of speech has now
become a matter not only of constitutional law and construction, but of
public policy as well. 22 The First Amendment right to free speech is
essential to keep the public informed of matters of public interest, because
an individual’s right and ability to speak affects the public’s knowledge.
Indeed, the right to speak is essential to democracy and liberty. As Harvard
professor Steven Pinker wrote:
There’s a systematic reason why dictators brook no
dissent. The immiserated subjects of a tyrannical regime
are not deluded that they are happy. And if tens of
millions of disaffected citizens act together, no regime has
the brute force to resist them. The reason that citizens
don’t resist their overlords en masse is that they lack what
logicians call common knowledge — the knowledge that
everyone else shares their knowledge. Common
knowledge is a prerequisite to coordinating behavior for
mutual benefit: two friends will show up at the same café
at a given time only if each knows that the other knows
that both know about the appointment. In the case of civil
resistance, people will expose themselves to the risk of

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
20
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986).
21
“We the people . . . “ See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
22
Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 320-21 (1998).
18
19
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reprisal by a despotic regime only if they know that others
are exposing themselves to that risk at the same time. 23
It is clear that confidentiality clauses limit one’s ability to speak freely,
thus also impacting the ability of the public to know certain details about
particular allegations, or even to know that the allegations exist at all. And,
while contracting away one’s right to speak in this limited way may not
necessarily lead to tyranny, it nonetheless places a chokehold on
democracy by limiting a fundamental right to free speech, thus limiting
common knowledge as well.

Freedom of Contract
However, the freedom of speech is not the only constitutional right
that matters in this scenario. Indeed, limiting one’s ability to contract away
their right to speech implicates one’s freedom of contract, which is found
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. While a contract
is a generally enforceable agreement, 24 it is often deemed void when “it
produces no legal obligation.” 25 Contracts may also be struck down on
grounds of public policy. 26 Part III of this comment will discuss the
balancing test under Restatement (second) of Contracts §section 178 that
strikes down contracts on grounds of public policy. However, the section
178 balancing test favors the enforcement of contracts. The general
purpose of contract law is to “recognize [] the power of parties to order
their own affairs without the intrusion of the government” – and, contract
law accomplishes this by providing a method of legal enforcement for
people’s private promises to each other. 27 Contract law allows people to
make their own private law as legally enforceable as the laws made by
legislatures. 28
The freedom of contract essentially provides that individuals have
the right to sign contracts including whatever terms to which they choose
to agree. This is beneficial because it promotes a free market and a laissezfaire economy, which is why public policy usually favors the enforcement
of contracts. Nevertheless, the “government can generate rules prohibiting
Steven Pinker, Three Reasons Free Speech Matters, FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC
EDUCATION (Nov. 7, 2014), https://fee.org/articles/three-reasons-free-speech-matters/.
24
A contract is an enforceable agreement. CONTRACT, The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier
Law Dictionary Desk Edition.
25
PERILLO, JOSEPH M., CONTRACTS 19 (7th ed. 2014). Under the Sunshine in Litigation
Act, discussed in Part IV of this comment, a confidentiality agreement would produce “no
legal obligation” in sexual abuse settlements.
26
Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15.
27
HILLMAN, ROBERT A., PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (4th ed. 2019).
28
Id.
23
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certain types of private agreements . . . “ and “can refuse to enforce certain
private contracts,” usually on the grounds that these types of agreements
run contrary to public policy. 29 Part IV of this comment will discuss how
the Sunshine in Litigation Act can serve to deem a contract void even if it
is not considered contrary to public policy under a section 178 balancing
test. 30 Indeed, unlike, the section 178 balancing test, the Act provides a
clear rule that favors not enforcing contracts that conceal a public hazard.31
Once the “public hazard” language has been applied to confidentiality
agreements in the context of sexual assault and abuse, it will be clear that
these agreements cannot stand under the Sunshine in Litigation Act,
regardless of whether they can or cannot be construed as running contrary
to public policy.

Confidentiality Agreements: Promises of Silence and Signing Away
the Right to Speak
As previously discussed, confidentiality agreements within
settlement contracts for alleged sexual abuse can create a direct tension
between the freedom of speech and the freedom of contract. “If a contract
is a legally enforceable promise, a contract of silence is an enforceable
promise to keep quiet about something.” 32 A confidentiality agreement—
also termed nondisclosure agreement— is “often required as a condition
of employment.” 33 However, there are other purposes besides employment
that require signing a confidentiality agreement. These agreements are
especially utilized in settlements.34
During litigation, the parties may reach an agreement and seek “a
court order of secrecy.” 35 In essence, the parties will ask the judge to
approve the settlement with a confidentiality order. 36 “Alternatively, the
parties may make the settlement contingent on the claimant dropping the
case against the defendant and further promising to never speak about
Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U.L.
REV. 263, 280.
30
The Sunshine in Litigation Act will deem a contract void even if it is contrary to public
policy favoring the enforcement of contracts.
31
“(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of
concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information
which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which
may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy and may not be
enforced.” FLA. STAT. § 69.081(4) (2018).
32
Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15.
33
Supra, note 1.
34
An agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit. SETTLEMENT, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014).
35
Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15.
36
Id.
29
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either the settlement or the events leading to the settlement.” 37 The
consequences of breaking “contracted silence,” once a confidentiality
agreement is signed by the parties may include a financial penalty, in
addition to full repayment of the settlement amount and the payment of
the opposing party’s legal fees. 38 The possibility of financial liability
severely impacts the freedom of victims to “speak publicly about [their
abuse, or] the events that led to the signing of these agreements.” 39
Several advocates active in the #MeToo movement have criticized
confidentiality agreements, specifically in connection with allegations of
sexual abuse, arguing that they have “the detrimental negative effects” of
“silencing victims” and enabling “repeat offenders.” 40 R. Kelly and
Harvey Weinstein are clear examples of how confidentiality agreements
can contribute to a legal and social culture that protects sexual abusers and
enables them to become repeat offenders, as critics have recently
discussed. In 2003, the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics
announced that “5.3 percent of sex offenders (men who had committed
rape or sexual assault) were rearrested for another sex crime.” 41 The
announcement also stated that “ . . . sex offenders were about four times
more likely than non-sex offenders to be arrested for another sex crime
after their discharge from prison – clearly outlining that repeat offenders
in the sexual abuse context are a valid and pressing concern. 42
Confidentiality agreements are usually considered to be
enforceable, largely because courts rarely interfere with the freedom of
contract. 43 However, in limited circumstances, the courts have declined to
enforce a contract in the name of public policy and in the interest of
disclosure to the public. 44 In civil cases, courts also have the authority to
nullify confidentiality agreements “where disclosure is in the public
interest.” 45 However, when there is a lack of a clear, legislative
expression, courts are more and more hesitant to tamper with contracts or
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Hogan Lovells, #MeToo Movement’s Impact on Nondisclosure Agreements or
Clauses Covering Sexual Harassment, HOGAN LOVELLS ALL IN A DAY’S WORK: THE
EMPLOYER’S
LEGAL
GUIDE
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.hlemploymentblog.com/2018/04/metoo-movements-impact-nondisclosureagreements-clauses-covering-sexual-harassment/ [hereinafter, Hogan Lovells].
41
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 5 Percent of Sex Offenders Rearrested for Another Sex
Crime Within 3 Years of Prison Release, BJS (Nov. 16, 2003, 4:30PM),
https://www.bjs.gov/ content/pub/press/rsorp94pr.cfm.
42
Id.
43
See Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15.
44
Id. at 2513.
45
Id. at 2513-14.
38
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to develop “broad social policy.” 46 Due to the courts’ hesitation to develop
policy of this kind, it is important for legislatures to step in and create laws
that prevent confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements. 47

III. CURRENT REMEDY FOR VICTIMS UNDER CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES: WHEN CONTRACTING AWAY YOUR RIGHT TO SPEAK
DOES NOT ALIGN WITH PUBLIC POLICY
Balancing
Due to the lack of legislation on this matter currently, the remedy
for victims of sexual abuse seeking to invalidate a confidentiality
agreement at this point would be found via the principles laid out in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 178. 48 Under section 178,
courts perform a balancing test when presented with any contract, or any
piece of a contract, that might violate public policy. 49 For example, courts
could theoretically find confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse
settlements void as a matter of public policy if “the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.” 50 Though confidentiality
agreements are contracts between private parties, they present a conflict
between the public policy favoring the freedom of contract and the public
policy favoring the freedom of speech.

Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy: Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 178
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 178
states:
When a Term Is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public
Policy:
Id. at 2514; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. b (1981)
(discussing how, in reaching the conclusion “that a term is unenforceable[,]” the court
relies on both “its own perception of the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare
or from legislation that is relevant to that policy although it says nothing explicitly about
unenforceability).
47
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. a (1981) (“Occasionally, on
grounds of public policy, legislation provides that specified kinds of promises or other
terms are unenforceable”).
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
49
Id.
50
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
46
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(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation
provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term,
account is taken of
(a) the parties’ justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement
were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement
of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a
term, account is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by
legislation or judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term
will further that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved
and the extent to which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that
misconduct and the term. 51
The power of courts to deny enforcement to a contract on public
policy grounds is not only indisputable, but also open-ended. 52 Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 178, “a contract or term will be
unenforceable when public policy considerations against enforcement
clearly outweigh the interests in favor of enforcement.” 53 The balancing
test “allows courts to derive public policy by considering other laws as
well as their own sense of what restrictions are needed to protect the public
welfare.” 54 When applying the balancing test, the decision of whether or
51
52
53
54

Id.
Garfield, supra note 22, at 294-95.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
Garfield, supra note 22, at 295.
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not to enforce a confidentiality agreement is based on a “fact-intensive
inquiry.” 55 “Such fact-intensive inquiries are common when courts police
contracts for public policy violations.” 56 In conducting balancing tests for
contracts of silence, the court would weigh the fundamental right to speak
and the value of the information being protected, versus the importance of
upholding the contract and affirming an individual’s right to freedom of
contract.
This balancing test has been used in the past to invalidate
confidentiality agreements as a matter of public policy. For example, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has decided that a
settlement agreement, even in sexual abuse circumstances, can prevent an
employee “from seeking monetary or other individual relief at the
agency. 57 However, “courts and the EEOC have invalidated agreement
terms that interfere with an individual’s non-waivable right as a matter of
public policy to file a charge or otherwise communicate with the EEOC.” 58
Despite this limited success in application, utilizing a fact-intensive
balancing test (as required under section 178 of the Restatement
((Second)) of Contracts) as a method of invalidating confidentiality
clauses as a remedy is not sufficient to protect victims of sexual abuse and
their right to speak, as well as the public’s right to know. This is because
using a fact-intensive balancing test produces different results on a case
by case basis. 59 As such, a more desirable method of attacking these
problematic confidentiality agreements would be via the adoption of a
clear rule that can be applied with confidence, whenever a court is
presented with confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements..
Legislatures can help the courts by providing a clear, administrable rule to
help solve this issue; or, courts can choose to interpret laws that are already
on the books – namely, the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act – as clearly
prohibiting these confidentiality agreements in this context. Parts IV and
V of this comment will analyze the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act as
a possible avenue to providing Florida courts with a clear rule for the
invalidation of these worrisome agreements.

55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 318.
Id.
Hogan Lovells, supra note 40.
Id.
Prasad, supra note 2, at 2541-42.
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IV. THE FLORIDA SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT
Confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements should be
deemed void 60 under the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act (“Act”), which
voids any court order or private agreement that conceals a “public
hazard.” 61 The Act, in part, states:
69.081 Sunshine in Litigation; Concealment of Public
Hazards Prohibited.
(1) This section may be cited as the “Sunshine in
Litigation Act.”
(2) As used in this section, “public hazard” means an
instrumentality, including but not limited to any device,
instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of
a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that
has caused and is likely to cause injury.
(3) Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an
order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of
concealing a public hazard or any information concerning
a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or
judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing
any information which may be useful to members of the
public in protecting themselves from injury which may
result from the public hazard.
(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any
information concerning a public hazard, or any
information which may be useful to members of the
public in protecting themselves from injury which may
result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public
policy 62 and may not be enforced . . .

This could serve a similar purpose as the first Restatement of Contracts definition of
“illegal bargain.” A bargain is “illegal . . . if either its formation or its performance is
criminal, tortious or otherwise opposed to public policy. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 512 (1932). Here, the formation of a bargain under confidentiality
agreements in sexual abuse settlements, in Florida, would be criminal in a sense because it
would violate Florida law.
61
FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018).
62
Although public policy favors the enforcement of contracts, the Act favors public
disclosure.
60
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(6) Any substantially affected person, including but not
limited to representatives of news media, has standing to
contest an order, judgment, agreement or contract that
violates this section. A person may contest an order,
judgment, agreement or contract that violates this section
by motion in the court that entered the order or judgment,
or by bringing a declaratory judgment action pursuant to
chapter 86 . . . 63
The Florida Supreme Court has not yet reviewed any case
concerning the Sunshine in Litigation Act. But there have been about
twenty-four cases heard in other Florida courts regarding the Act, with the
most recent case being from 2017 and with three opinions being
withdrawn altogether. Furthermore, Florida courts have not yet gotten the
chance to review a sexual abuse settlement case under the Sunshine in
Litigation Act. The Third District Court of Appeal referred to the Act in
Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 896 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997), but only “to observe that it was not called upon to decide whether
the statute prohibited enforcement of the confidentiality provisions of a
settlement agreement in a sexual harassment case.”64 Regardless of there
being no case law in this particular, niche issue, this section will discuss
certain relevant cases to provide background as to the courts’
interpretation of the Act in the context of sexual abuse settlements.
Most sexual abuse settlements settle out of court, but Florida
courts can still provide a safeguard to prevent confidentiality in these
circumstances. If a case did go to the Florida Supreme Court, the Court
should rule that alleged sexual abusers 65 are a “public hazard” because
they are “person[s] . . . that ha[ve] caused and [are] likely to cause
injury.” 66 Withholding valuable information of public interest, such as the
identity of a sexual abuser due to a confidentiality agreement in a sexual
abuse settlement, should qualify as a “condition of a person . . . that has
caused and is likely to cause injury.” 67 Therefore, the Act would prevent
concealing a sexual abuser’s identity because the Act favors public
disclosure of a public hazard. 68 And, as a result of this construction, sexual
abuse settlements in Florida should be prohibited from concealment under
the Act, and confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements would
FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018).
Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 896 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
65
A sexual abuser could also be defined as “a person who could be charged with a felony
sex offense.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (2019).
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be considered void under Florida law. Particularly in the context of the
#MeToo movement, it is clear that many victims would have been
protected if the public knew of the abuse of previous victims. Especially
in egregious cases such as the sexual abuse running rampant in Catholic
church, as well as the repeated abuses of Harvey Weinstein and R. Kelly,
it is obvious that some of this abuse could’ve been curtailed had the public
been properly informed. Indeed, it is even possible that some of these
perpetrators (including Harvey Weinstein and R. Kelly) would have been
jailed years ago, thus thereby reducing the number of victims he was able
to access and reducing overall the amount of harm that inflicted upon
society as a whole. Keeping this in mind, it is all the more vital that Florida
courts uphold a bright-line rule invalidating confidentiality agreements in
sexual abuse contexts, at this particular point in history; and, there is some
common law basis for the promulgation of this rule, as well.

Case Law in Favor of the “Public Hazard” Standard
In 1992, the First District Court of Appeal in Florida applied the
Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act and invalidated a court order for
protection. 69 In AcandS, Inc. v. Askew, an asbestos action, the trial court
granted a protective order covering documents and depositions . 70
However, the Act, as applied by the appellate court, invalidated the court
order because it concealed information concerning asbestos, which is
considered a “public hazard” under the language of the Act. 71 Just as a
court order obfuscating from public view information related to an
asbestos action is invalid, 72 similarly, a court order covering up an
offender’s sexual misconduct should be invalid – because, just as asbestos
has been viewed by courts as a public hazard, alleged sexual abusers
should be viewed as the same. 73
Further support for this argument is found in Jones v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., wherein the Third District Court of Appeal found a
public hazard in a personal injury action against a tire manufacturer. 74
Specifically, there the jury found that the plaintiff had been injured from
an explosion of the manufacturer’s tire, and the court then deemed the tire
to be a “public hazard” – as such, the court then chose to overturn a motion
for a confidentiality order (which had prohibited the parties and their
ACandS, Inc. v. Askew, 597 So. 2d 895, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Id. at 896.
71
Id.
72
ACandS, 597 So. 2d at 895.
73
Florida courts could also interpret the Sunshine in Litigation Act considering the
“California Felony Sex Law” that will be discussed further under section V of this
comment.
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Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 899 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003).
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counsel from disclosing the manufacturer’s documents obtained during the
discovery). 75 Following this ruling, no order could be entered which
would conceal information regarding the tire, because it had been
determined by a jury – by a preponderance of the evidence, presumably –
that that tire had injured a member of the public (namely, plaintiff Jones). 76
And, in a similar case – Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Schalmo – the
Second District Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in entering
a blanket confidentiality order without conducting an in-camera review to
ensure that no information being concealed contained data on any public
hazard, particularly regarding the treads (or lack thereof) of Goodyear’s
tires. 77 Following the holdings in Jones and Schalmo, it is only natural to
argue that sexual abusers can be considered a public hazard because they
cause personal injury to their victims, and have the potential to cause even
further injury to future victims. Particularly when one considers that,
within the context of Sunshine in Litigation Act jurisprudence, the burden
to conceal is on the offender and the Act favors disclosure, 78 it is clear that
Florida courts should not be allowed to enter confidentiality orders in
sexual abuse settlements as a matter of law.

Case Law Against the “Public Hazard” Standard
While the previous cases illustrate the attempts of Florida courts
to determine what does qualify as a public hazard, courts in Florida have
also worked to interpret what does not qualify as a public hazard.
However, these cases are easily distinguishable from cases involving
alleged sexual assault and abuse. For example, in State Farm Fire &
Casualty, Co. v. Sosnowski, a Florida court held that economic fraud
causing financial loss was not a public hazard within the meaning of the
Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act. 79 Clearly, cases involving sexual abuse
concern more than mere financial injury and, as such, would not be
constrained by this decision. Indeed, the main barrier that could prevent
courts from declaring confidentiality clauses in the sexual abuse context
to be void comes not in the form of conflicting case law, but in an analysis
of legislative intent.
Unfortunately, the Sunshine in Litigation Act is not written
specifically for sexual abuse settlements and, as such, its language may
provide “wiggle-room” for offenders. Indeed, since the Act was not
75

Id.
Id. at 905-06.
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See generally, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Schalmo, 987 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla.
2nd DCA 2008).
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FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018).
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enacted specifically to apply in the context of sexual abuse claims, Florida
courts are not obligated to the interpret the Act to apply in these kinds of
claims. It is possible that a Florida court may regard a sexual abuse
victim’s motion—to determine that a secret settlement with their offender
is concealing a public hazard—as overbroad, and therefore choose not to
protect the settlement from concealment under the Sunshine in Litigation
Act. There may be other grounds, as well, for courts to refuse to apply the
Sunshine in Litigation Act as prohibiting confidentiality agreements in this
context. As such, the best solution to this problem is for the Florida
legislature to enact legislation specifically prohibiting confidentiality
agreements in sexual abuse settlements.

V. RESOLUTION: THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE SHOULD ENACT
LEGISLATION DISFAVORING CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS IN
SEXUAL ABUSE SETTLEMENTS
Because leaving this matter up to the interpretation of the
Sunshine in Litigation Act by Florida courts may result in uneven and
uncertain results due to their ad hoc decision-making methods, it is
necessary for the Florida legislature to enact a statute prohibiting the
concealment of sexual abuse settlements. This law would actually follow
new trends in the law which, as a result of the #MeToo movement,
discourage confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse cases. 80 The Florida
legislature can use these newly enacted laws as models to draft and enact
its own legislation to specifically disfavor confidentiality agreements in
sexual abuse settlements. The remainder of this section will discuss this
potential law as a resolution to this problem, including proposed language
that the Florida legislature can consider, while keeping in mind a victim’s
privacy concerns.

The #MeToo Movement and New Legislation
In light of the #MeToo movement, confidentiality provisions in
settlements for sexual abuse claims have come under increased criticism.81
Recently, the United States Congress amended the federal tax code to
disfavor sexual abuse settlements that are subject to confidentiality
agreements. Specifically, the code now states (under section 162(q)) that
settlements and payments for sexual harassment or sexual abuse claims
subject to confidentiality agreements are not able to be deducted as a

80
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Hogan Lovells supra note 40.
Id.
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business expense. 82 This new policy encourages companies to settle sexual
harassment or sexual abuse claims without the use of confidentiality
agreements so that the payments related to these claims can be valid
business deductions under the tax code. 83 This is a very persuasive policy
since settlements of these kind of claims can cost businesses thousands
and sometimes millions of dollars. And, while Congress did not
specifically mention the #MeToo movement as a reason for the
amendment, Congress enacting the specific provision under the current
climate demonstrates a clear correlation, if not a specific causation.
The #MeToo movement has also affected legislation at the state
level in the United States. In response to the #MeToo movement, states
such as California, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington,
have announced legislation to prevent the use of confidentiality
agreements in workplace related sexual abuse settlements. 84 “Each state
proposal has its own specifics, but in general they render invalid the use
or enforcement of [confidentiality] provisions related to sexual abuse,
either as part of any non-disclosure agreement, or in the context of
settlement agreements, or both.” 85 An example of a newly enacted state
legislation is the law in Washington. The Washington legislation considers
confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse cases “void and
unenforceable.” 86 The Washington legislation specially states:
2) Except for settlement agreements under subsection (4)
of this section, any nondisclosure agreement, waiver, or
other document signed by an employee as a condition of
employment that has the purpose or effect of preventing
the employee from disclosing or discussing sexual
harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace,
at work-related events coordinated by or through the
employer, or between employees, or between an
employer and an employee, off the employment premises
is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. 87
Like in Washington, there was a bill recently introduced by the legislature
in California that is geared towards sexual abuse in the workplace.88 The
26 U.S.C.A. § 162.
Id.
84
Hogan Lovells supra note 40.
85
Id.
86
Non-disclosure agreements that prevent disclosure of sexual assault or sexual
harassment prohibited--Settlement agreement exception, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 49.44.210.
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Prasad, supra note 2, at 2522.
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bill was introduced following the Harvey Weinstein scandal. 89 This bill is
titled “STAND (Stand Together Against Non-Disclosures Act).” 90 When
speaking on the importance of the STAND bill, Senator Leyva made these
comments:
“SB 820 is an important bill that will finally ban secret
settlements, one of the primary tools that perpetrators
have used time and time again to silence victims and
prevent them from publicly acknowledging the
harassment, assault, and discrimination they have
endured,” Senator Leyva said. “I am grateful that my
Senate colleagues approved this bill today, since it sends
a loud and clear message to victims that we believe them,
we stand by them and will do all we can to protect
them. SB 820 shreds the curtain of secrecy that has forced
victims to remain silent and empowers them to speak their
truth so that we can hopefully protect other victims
moving forward. Perpetrators must be held accountable
for their actions and SB 820 is a sensible bill that helps to
keep workplaces in California, both in the public and
private sectors, free from sexual harassment and assault.
Enough is enough!” 91
Even countries outside of the United States have begun
disfavoring confidentiality agreements in cases of sexual assault and
harassment, most likely due in no small part to the #MeToo movement.
For example, in Great Britain, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (which
regulates law firms), recently issued a warning notice that confidentiality
agreements were being used improperly. 92 The regulation authority said
that confidentiality agreements “should not be used to prevent people from
reporting misconduct to regulators or offenses to law enforcement
agencies, or as a means of improperly threatening litigation against, or
otherwise seeking improperly to influence, an individual in order to
prevent or deter or influence a proper disclosure.” 93 Soon after the
Solicitors Regulation Authority’s warning notice, the British Parliament’s
89
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Women and Equalities Committee released a report on sexual abuse in the
workplace, which urged the government to “clean up” the use of
confidentiality agreements. 94 The committee also urged the government to
enforce better control and regulation of the agreements due to the concern
that these agreements are being used to silence victims. 95 As a result,
Prime Minister Theresa May commented that some employers are using
confidentiality agreements unethically, and promised to “ . . . bring
forward measures for consideration for consultation to seek to improve the
regulation around non-disclosure agreements and make it absolutely
explicit to employees when a non-disclosure agreement does not apply or
cannot be enforced.” 96
While these reforms do illustrate a shift towards the increased
regulation of confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements, they
are largely limited to the employment context. This is undesirable, because
legislation limited to the employment sector does not provide enough
protection to all possible victims of sexual harassment or sexual assault.
For example, the children who were abused by Catholic priests would not
be protected under laws preventing confidentiality in sexual abuse claims
only in the employment context. Instead of enacting legislation
particularly aimed at employees, it would be more effective for state and
federal legislatures to create laws that prevent confidentiality agreements
in sexual abuse settlements across all sectors. California has actually
passed a statute which disfavors confidentiality clauses in sexual assault
and harassment settlement agreements, which applies outside of the
workplace context. 97 California’s “Felony Sex Law” 98 “prohibits the use
of confidentiality clauses in civil settlements if the ‘factual foundation’ for
the underlying allegations involved acts that could be prosecuted as felony
sexual offenses.” 99 Furthermore, California requires attorneys to comply
with the law as well, under threat of reprimand by the state bar
association. 100 Specifically, the statute prescribes that “an attorney who
demands that a confidentiality provision be included in a settlement
agreement that conceals an act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex
offense, or even advises a client to sign such an agreement, may face
discipline by the State Bar of California.” 101 This enforcement of the law
against the attorneys provides an additional level of protection for a
94
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96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id.
Id.
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victim’s right to speak. Yet, the law does not apply to cases which are only
likely to be convicted as misdemeanors. 102
Even though there are currently no cases where courts in
California have interpreted or applied the “Felony Sex Law,” 103 on its face,
the California law generally appears to have been successful in providing
significant protection for victims and their right to speak in sexual abuse
cases. “Given that [the California law] covers sexual acts that can be
prosecuted as felonies, however, it has tremendous potential to be applied
to rapes or sexual harassment with criminal undertones that are settled with
confidentiality agreements.” 104 In comparing the California “Felony Sex
Law” to the other legislations of this kind, on its face, the California law
provides more protection to victims than the other legislations because it
is not limited to an employment context. As such, if the Florida legislature
were to consider enacting laws invalidating confidentiality clauses in
sexual abuse settlements, California’s felony sex law may be a good place
to start (although Florida’s law should not limit its disfavor of
confidentiality clauses to cases involving sexual assault or harassment that
can be prosecuted as a felony, and should instead expand it to include
misdemeanors, as well). The proposed language of this statute is as
follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a
settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of
factual information related to the action is prohibited in
any civil action the factual foundation for which
establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of
the following:
(1) An act that may be prosecuted as a sex offense.
(2) An act of childhood sexual abuse.
(3) An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, or conduct
prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant.
(4) An act of sexual assault against an elder or dependent
adult. 105
It should be noted that the language of this proposed statute does not
prevent a victim from refusing to speak – that is, from keeping the details
102
103
104
105
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of her alleged assault, harassment, or abuse confidential – if she so
chooses. Instead, the proposed statutory language attempts to protect a
victim’s right to privacy by reserving victims the right to keep these details
private while preventing the alleged abuser from requiring the victim to
remain silent, as a condition of settlement. This balances a victim’s privacy
interests with their right to speak, as well as their ability to seek justice in
a court of law.

VI. CONCLUSION
The #MeToo movement has given many victims of sexual abuse
a voice to finally speak out, discuss their potentially traumatizing
experiences, and seek healing and support from their community.
However, a hashtag and comments on social media simply are not enough.
The law must also give these victims support and provide protection for
victims by preventing predators from becoming repeat offenders under
promises of silence guaranteed by confidentiality agreements. Indeed, the
utilization of confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements dates
as far back as the Catholic church scandal (with Catholic priests abusing
children) and have continued to be used in cases as recent as the Harvey
Weinstein and R. Kelly scandals. These clauses should be void, by law.
Confidentiality clauses in sexual abuse settlements permit the sexual
abusers to hide their identities from the public and enables them to repeat
their offenses. They infringe upon the public’s right to know and the
victims’ right to speak.
Under the Sunshine in Litigation Act, sexual abusers are a “public
hazard” because they are “person[s] . . . that ha[ve] caused and [are] likely
to cause injury.” 106 Since the Act prohibits concealment of public hazards,
sexual abuse settlements should not be kept from the public and victims
should not be prevented from speaking. 107 Therefore, this interpretation of
the Act would prevent concealing a sexual abuser’s identity and, as a
result, confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements would be
considered void under Florida law. 108 If Florida courts were to determine
that the concealment of sexual abuse settlements is not prohibited by the
Sunshine in Litigation Act, the Florida legislature should then enact a
statute prohibiting the concealment of sexual abuse settlements. This law
could mirror California’s felony sex law, but without limiting it to felonies.
This would provide the maximum protection for sexual abuse victims and
help prevent future victims by encouraging public disclosure of sexual
106
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abusers instead of shielding their identities under confidentiality
agreements. The #MeToo movement has illuminated many of the
deficiencies in our social and legal approaches to victims of sexual assault,
harassment and abuse – it is vital that our state courts and legislatures
attempt to close these gaps, for the protection of current and future victims,
and the preservation of the rule of law, for years to come.
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